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N his book, Playing by the Rules, Professor Frederick Schauer accepts
as a truism that "the precepts of morality need not be as detailed as
those contained in the Internal Revenue Code."1 Tax lawyers usually
favor precise rules and criticize the courts' application of broad standards.
In recent testimony about corporate tax shelters to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, for example, Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee, praised the "the tax system's reliance on objective rule-based
criteria."' 2 Similarly, in delivering the Fourth Annual Lawrence Neal
Woodworth Memorial Lecture, Kenneth Gideon, former Assistant Secre-
tary for Tax Policy, called for reducing "our reliance on antiabuse rules
and litigation over uncertain 'smell' tests in favor of directly providing
administrable rules through legislation and the published guidance
process."'3
In the recent debates about corporate tax shelters, however, the pat-
tern has reversed. Many private practitioners and corporate executives
have decried with a moral fervor governmental attempts to codify and, in
so doing, define more precisely in statutes or regulations such broad judi-
cial anti-avoidance doctrines as business purpose or economic substance.
This criticism has targeted the statutory proposals in the President's
Budget Proposals and in the Senate Finance Committee's Corporate Tax
Shelter Preliminary Discussion Draft.4 The partnership anti-abuse regu-
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lations provoked similar but even more strident opposition.5 Animus has
been directed not only at the substance of the rules and whether they are
effective or administrable, but also at the very attempt to write them. For
at least some members of the tax bar, judicial anti-abuse standards have
suddenly become a cause for celebration rather than dismay.
The issues raised by the debate about legal rules versus standards are
not unique to tax shelters or tax law. The premise of this article is that
theoretical examinations of the working and interpretation of rules, such
as Professor Schauer's, 6 can illuminate and perhaps advance this and
other tax debates. In his book Schauer posits a close relationship be-
tween rules and their justifications. He further argues that rules not only
foster predictability, reliance, and certainty, but also serve as devices for
the allocation of power.7 This paper uses Schauer's work to suggest that
the recent corporate tax debate has conflated concerns about the appro-
priate level of generality for tax shelter anti-avoidance rules with con-
cerns about separation of power, failing to sort out the relationship
between these different aspects of rules. Taking these concerns as sepa-
rate parts of any analysis clarifies the issues at stake and their possible
resolution. In particular, such an analysis underscores the extent to which
parties to the debate disagree about the impact of such codified rules on
judges, administrative agents, and tax professionals.
This paper looks at purposive common law doctrines and their codifica-
tion from a distance, at a general level. It does not attempt to analyze the
content of any proposed codification, proposed improvements to them, or
to compare the impact of substantive requirements to different kinds of
approaches, such as increasing penalties. Instead, it uses the occasion of
the current tax shelter debate to consider the perennial, recurring issues
about rules versus standards and their codifications. This approach is
necessarily incomplete. Nonetheless, I believe that such a general analy-
sis will aid in the task confronting the tax community of working out an
approach to corporate tax shelters and other similar issues.
Part I of the paper summarizes Schauer's approach to rules and their
justifications. Part II applies his concepts to the tax shelter debate. Part
III explains that codification of broad standards raises important con-
cerns about excessive exercise of administrative discretion, but that the
administrative process in general and the tax administrative process in
particular tend to operate to limit administrative discretion. The last sec-
tion observes that private parties are concerned about the errors of ad-
TREASURY, WHITE PAPER: THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS (DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS) (July 1999).
5. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
6. For other considerations of rules, see, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social
Facts, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703 (1991); Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Con-
strain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561 (1989); Colin S. Diver, The
Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin,
The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
7. See SCHAUER, supra note 1.
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ministrative officials, while administrative officials are concerned about
the errors of private parties. In the absence of empirical data about the
size of the problem, resolution of this disagreement must be a matter of
informed judgment, a best guess. Professor Schauer's analytical frame-
work will enable us to ask more precise questions in making this
judgment.
I. SCHAUER'S THEORY OF RULES
Professor Schauer undertakes a consideration of rules at their most
general level of application, what he calls a "philosophical examination."
In his book, he mentions tax laws only a few times in passing.8 Moreover,
he does not limit himself to legal rules, although law is an important focus
of the work. Since tax laws are one subset of legal rules and legal rules a
particular subset of rules, his discourse raises many of the same points as
those that have been raised in the debate about tax shelters. His disinter-
ested, neutral and theoretical consideration of rules and their operation
along with his analysis of the different kinds of justifications for rules
provides a useful lens through which to view the current tax debate. The
following summarizes this work for purposes of this paper, although it
necessarily oversimplifies his nuanced and ambitious undertaking.
Rules, Schauer explains, are generalizations and "[b]ehind every gener-
alization is a justification. Sometimes called goals, sometimes purposes,
or sometimes even (confusingly) reasons, justifications exist because nor-
mative generalizations are ordinarily instrumental and not ultimate, and
justifications are what they are instrumental to."9 Generalizations, in the
form of rules, narrow justifications. They "specify the result that will
usually be obtained from direct application of their justification." 10 Justi-
fications themselves exist on different levels so that "there may be
stacked layers of rules" with comparatively specific justifications them-
selves having "deeper and yet more abstract justifications."11
Schauer is not advancing a primarily linguistic, literary or rhetorical
argument.' 2 Under Schauer's analysis, purposes or justifications neither
supply a maxim of statutory interpretation nor aid in parsing the rule.
Rules and justifications are closely bound together, with a justification
having an analytical priority over the rule. 13 Decision-makers resort to
justifications when the language of the rule produces a result seemingly
8. See SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 13-14, 102, 119, 207.
9. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 53.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 73.
12. As he explains, "rules and their formulations are different .... [W]e commonly
distinguish different rules according to what they do, rather than how they say it."
SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 63.
13. Unfortunately, Schauer does not tell us how we identify a rule's justification or
justifications or discuss whether conflicting justifications can exist; he seems to assume that
the justification is clear. Fortunately, the judicial anti-abuse doctrines provide the justifica-
tions in the case of tax shelters.
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inconsistent with its purpose, rather than when the language of the rule is
ambiguous.
For Schauer, rules become interesting when they are under- or over-
inclusive, that is, "when a particular application of a rule generates a re-
sult divergent from that which would have been generated by direct ap-
plication of the rule's justification."'1 4 In the case of such a divergence, he
identifies two basic decision-making modes:
Under one mode, the decision-maker treats the pre-existing general-
ization of a rule as if it arose in conversation, modifying it when and
as it is unfaithful to the rule's underlying justifications. The existing
generalization operates merely as the defeasible marker of a deeper
reality. It is transparent rather than opaque, and a decision-maker
operating in this mode is expected to look through that transparent
generalization to something deeper when recalcitrant experiences
present themselves.15
By contrast, rule-based decision-making offers an alternative mode of
decision-making. It would have a decision-maker "treat the generaliza-
tion of a rule as entrenched, prescribing (although not necessarily conclu-
sively) the decision to be made even in cases in which the resultant
decision is not one that would have been reached by direct application of
the rule's justification.' 6 For such a decision-maker generalizations are
more than mere indicators.' 7 Here, generalizations supply "reasons for
decision independent of those supplied by the generalization's underlying
justification.' 8 In this second mode, the rule gives the decision-maker a
reason for decision even when the application of the rule in the particular
circumstance "does not serve its generating justification.' 19
Schauer goes on to elaborate a third method of decision-making, one
that combines elements of both these decision-making modes. With this
third mode of decision-making, Schauer issues an important caution to
any decision-maker weighing application of a rule against its justification.
He calls upon a decision-maker in this circumstance to consult "both sub-
stantive justifications and the justifications for specifying those justifica-
tions in the form of a rule." 20  The justifications for specifying
justifications in the form of a rule, he explains, "are commonly seen to
serve the goals of certainty, reliance, and predictability." 2' In this mode,
a decision-maker may adhere to a rule even when direct application of
the justification behind the rule would produce a different result because,
for example, of "the rule-generating justification of lessening addressee
uncertainty. '22 A "particularistic decision-maker aware of the value of
14. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 72.




19. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 76.
20. Id. at 94.
21. Id. at 95.
22. Id. at 95-96.
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rules" must consider "the effect on future conduct of deciding according
to the substantive justification rather than according to the rule."'23
That is, the decision-maker sometimes will and sometimes will not con-
clude that the values supporting the substantive justification outweigh the
consequences of diminished certainty, reliance, and predictability. 24 By
virtue of asking such questions, a decision-maker can engage in "rule-
sensitive particularism," a procedure that appears to take account of the
virtues of rules without at the same time "elevating those rules into an
absurd position of formal importance purely for formality's sake."' 25 In
short, "if the virtues of rules are seen to reside largely in the fostering of
predictability, reliance, and certainty, then rule-sensitive particularism
appears to take account of these virtues without committing the sin of
rule-worship. "26
When he focuses on law as a set of rules, Schauer modifies rule sensi-
tive particularism into what he dubs "presumptive positivism. '27 Rules
have priority over their justifications but "that priority exists only as a
presumption, subject to being overcome in particularly exigent cases." '28
Often, the justification or justifications for the rule constitute the exi-
gency needed to override it. Sometimes other values or justifications, in-
cluding non-legal ones, apart from those behind the particular rule
provide the exigency.29
Schauer, in a move that I believe to be of particular relevance to the
current debate about tax shelters, urges that "we see rules not so much as
implements for achieving predictability but as devices for the allocation
of power." 30 Rules are jurisdictional. If we take such a view, "then it is
far from clear that granting the power to a rule-applier to determine
whether following the rule is on the balance of reasons desirable on this
occasion is necessarily desirable."'31 He further explains:
[I]f the designer of a decision-making environment is guided by a
concern that certain decision-makers not make certain kinds of deci-
sions, it appears psychologically counterintuitive ... to authorize
decision-makers to determine in each case whether this is the kind of
decision with respect to which they should not be trusted. . . .To
have an agent operating in one jurisdiction determine if this is a case
in which she should invade the decision-making jurisdiction of an-
other is in substantial tension with the very idea of jurisdictional
separation.32
23. Id. at 96.
24. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 96.
25. Id. at 97.
26. Id. at 98.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 191.
29. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 200-02. Schauer discusses the use of more general val-
ues and norms to override rules under presumptive positivism in Frederick Schauer, Rules
and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 675-79 (1991).
30. Id. at 98.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 98-99.
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Some "withdrawals of decisional jurisdiction are based on a distrust of
decision-makers-on a fear that some types of decision makers, when
empowered to consider certain kinds of facts, reasons, and arguments,
will consider them unwisely and thus produce mistaken decisions. '33
While some matters of jurisdiction result from explicit jurisdictional rules,
other limits on decisional discretion may be a matter of policy or culture.
"[E]ven when judges and other legal officials are given narrow and spe-
cific prescriptions with which to work," different sets of officials may dif-
fer in the extent to which they are "instructed or compelled to treat the
prescriptions as opaque mandatory rules rather than transparent rules of
thumb." 34
Schauer directs us to examine both decision-makers and decision-mak-
ing environments. He recommends that "[i]n a world of non-ideal deci-
sion makers, therefore, one should calculate the virtues of ruleness based
not only on an assessment of the costs of errors of under- or over-inclu-
sion, but also on an assessment of the incidence and consequences of
those errors that are more likely when decision-makers are not con-
strained by rules."'35
Both strands of Schauer's analysis-presumptive positivism and the
different kinds of justifications for rules-bear upon the current and
other debates about rules versus standards. By sorting suggestions and
commentary in this debate along both of these dimensions, we will be
better able to identify areas of agreement as well as disagreement. His
analysis gives a new take on both those who defend and those who attack
use of standards or justification.
II. APPLYING SCHAUER'S INSIGHTS
Although Schauer's failure to explore in detail how decision-makers
should identify justifications for rules is a serious flaw in his analysis, in
the case of corporate tax shelters, the justifications at issue are already
identified-the doctrines of economic substance and business purpose-
even if the precise content of these accepted justifications itself provokes
disagreement. 36
As Schauer acknowledges in an article published the same year as his
book, what he calls the justification behind a rule, others refer to as "'dis-
cretion' or the application of 'standards.' ' 37 The tax debate is usually
couched in terms of rules versus standards, and thus, I will use the terms
"standards," "purpose," and "discretion" as well as his term
"justification."
33. Id. at 158.
34. Id. at 173.
35. Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, supra note 29, at 685.
36. See, e.g., David Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX
LAw. 235 (1999); Robert Thornton Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the Citadel,
53 TAX LAW. 1 (1999).
37. Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, supra note 29, at 653.
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The following discussion will consider four aspects of Schauer's analy-
sis: (1) the close relationship between rules and their justifications; (2)
the traditional values of predictability, reliance, and consistency associ-
ated with rules; (3) rules as instruments of separation of powers; and (4)
the importance of considering the incidence and consequence of errors.
It will apply these considerations to both judges and administrative
officials.
The first two of these considerations-the need to take account of not
only the rule but also its justification and the need to consider the values
of resorting to rules to carry out justifications-define presumptive posi-
tivism. Accepting presumptive positivism, at least for the next few pages,
has significant consequences for many aspects of the recurring debate re-
garding rules and standards in the tax law. Presumptive positivism affects
how we understand both the judicial doctrines themselves and any codifi-
cation of them.
Consider first judicial use of anti-abuse standards. In the corporate tax
shelter controversy, commentators have extolled the judicial anti-abuse
doctrines and even supported their expansion. The Tax Section of the
New York State Bar Association, for example, objects to codifying the
economic substance rule in part on the grounds that such a rule would
"undermine the common law economic substance doctrine itself.' '38 It
urges that if any such rule is enacted, it "clearly provide that it does not
supplant case law doctrines . . . and is not intended to discourage the
courts from applying or expanding these doctrines. '39 Lee Sheppard of
Tax Analysts has written, "it is the contention of some opponents of tax
shelter legislation that the government's recent court victories obviate the
need for new tax shelter laws."'40
Endorsement of the common-law doctrines is not, however, universally
shared. Traditionally, many have argued that judicial doctrines invoking
justifications or standards have no place in a highly articulated set of rules
such as the tax code. They take the position that judges have no authority
to ground decisions on such standards and that opinions on this basis lack
legitimacy. Professor Joseph Isenbergh has eloquently made the case
against "extrastatutory" standards, "an additional (and somewhat auton-
omous) set of principles for deciding tax disputes."'41 Instead, he en-
38. Robert H. Scarborough, NYSB Tax Section Concerned About Codifying Substance
Doctrine, 2000 TAX NoTEs TODAY 146-25 (2000), available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File.
39. Id.
40. Lee A. Sheppard, Analysis: COLI Scam Gets Well Deserved Pummeling, 85 TAX
NoTEs 569, 569 (1999).
41. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
859, 864 (1982); see John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the
Tax Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (1997); Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and
Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445 (1993); Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation:
The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason,
"Purposivism," and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX. L. REV. 677 (1996); Law-
rence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64
N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986). Isenbergh's phrase "judicial intuition" captures nicely the prob-
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dorses the principle espoused by Judge Sternhagen in Gregory v.
Commissioner,42 finding for Mrs. Gregory that "[a] statute so meticu-
lously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing
policy, and leaves only the small interstices for judicial consideration. '43
As Professor Isenbergh would have it, "[w]hen we are dealing with statu-
tory terms of art, the form-substance dichotomy is a false one. 'Sub-
stance' can only be derived from forms created by the statute itself. Here
there is form and little else; there is no natural law of reverse triangular
mergers. '44 Isenbergh believes that had Gregory gone the other way,
"we would now have a more readily fathomable demarcation between
the respective spheres of statutory provisions and judicial intuition. '45
Presumptive positivism might ultimately agree with Isenbergh and
award victory to Mrs. Gregory, but it would do so on very different
grounds. It would deny that statutory terms of art crowd out justifica-
tions. In this view of rules, substance creates, rather than being derived
from, the forms in the statute. We may distance rules from their justifica-
tions, but under Schauer's view, recourse to justifications is always legiti-
mate. It may, however, not be prudent. Presumptive positivism demands
that the decision-maker also consider the justifications for narrowing jus-
tifications in the form of a rule. In the case of a meticulously drafted
statute, such as the reorganization provisions at issue in Gregory, those
justifications would be particularly strong and could well lead a judge fol-
lowing presumptive positivism to side with Mrs. Gregory. As Judge Hand
himself put it in Gregory, "as the articulation of a statute increases, the
room for interpretation must contract. '46
A belief that judges often fail to weigh sufficiently the Big Three justifi-
cations for rules (certainty, predictability, and reliance) lies at the heart of
most critiques of cases that apply the judicial anti-abuse standards. Thus,
Kenneth Gideon tells us that the basic defect of all anti-abuse rules is
uncertainty: "There is no clear delineation between situations in which
the rule applies to deny benefit and those in which it doesn't ..... [[T]he
ACM case] leaves us far short of a transparent, understandable, and ad-
ministrable rule to explain the outcome of the case-and more important
still-to predict the outcome of the next case."' 47 Here, Gideon speaks as
a presumptive positivist, asserting that in the case of the tax law, rule-
generating justifications are especially strong. He is just as much of a
presumptive positivist when he also urges that "particularly aggressive
cases should be litigated for their exemplary value."'48
lem with Shauer's analysis identified above-the failure to identify the source or appropri-
ate content of justifications.
42. 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affid, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
43. Id. at 225.
44. Isenbergh, supra note 41, at 879.
45. Id. at 883.
46. Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), af-id, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
47. Gideon, supra note 3, at 1001 (citing ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.
1998)).
48. Id. at 1004.
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As Gideon's position demonstrates, judicial use of such standards is
now well-established and long sanctioned by Supreme Court opinions.
49
Those who accept judicial use of anti-abuse doctrines may nonetheless
criticize their codification as statutes or regulations. To the extent codifi-
cation takes the form of regulations, critics go so far as to deny adminis-
trative agencies the authority to promulgate such an approach. This
position surfaced most sharply when the Department of the Treasury pro-
posed a broad partnership anti-abuse rule under section 701 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.50 The American Bar Association, Section of
Taxation, Committee on Partnerships, asserted that a regulation that
would deny partnership transactions the benefits of the Subchapter K on
the basis that certain transactions were inconsistent with the purpose of
Subchapter K was invalid because it did "not interpret the language or
meaning of section 701 under which it is being promulgated."''5 Similarly,
in the corporate tax shelter debate, Kenneth Kies has demanded, "If we
cannot rely on the language of the statutes and regulations, then what are
we supposed to rely on?"5 2
Many have criticized such a theory of language and statutory interpre-
tation. For example, Professor Johnson writes, "[I]t is sometimes as-
sumed by the formalistic school of interpretation that the tax law must be
clear and simple and that the taxpayer must benefit, and government
must suffer, from any ambiguities or misinterpretations of the tax law....
[T]he English language and human understanding never reach the level
of perfection that the formalistic school expects. '5 3 Like Professor John-
son, others who take a less formalistic view of language also have charac-
terized the business purpose and economic substance doctrines as rules of
statutory and regulatory interpretation that seek "to interpret statutory
rules rather than add new requirements to them."
'5 4
Schauer would quarrel with this understanding as well. To call the ap-
plication of a standard "statutory interpretation" is misleading. One of
the most important lessons of Playing by the Rules is that decision-makers
who conclude that a rule is inconsistent with its purpose are not interpret-
ing the particular language of the rule. In the case of the common law tax
doctrines, characterization as interpretation narrows these doctrines in a
49. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. Commenting on Gregory v. Helvering,
legislative history has endorsed courts "for a commendable tendency to look through the
mere form of the transaction into its substance." H.R. 704, 73d Cong., 13 (2d Sess. 1934).
50. Section 701 states: "A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax
imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for in-
come tax only in their separate or individual capacities." I.R.C. § 701 (1986).
51. William H. Caudill, Comments Concerning Proposed Regulation Under Section 701
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 94 TAX NoTEs TODAY 146-50 (1994), available at
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
52. Kenneth J. Kies, Letter to the Editor: Corporate Tax Shelters: It's Time to Come to
Terms With the Data, 88 TAX NorEs 133 (2000).
53. Calvin Johnson, The Anti-Skunk Works Corporate Tax Shelter Act of 1999, 84 TAX
NoTEs 443 (1999).
54. Scarborough, supra note 38. Courts have also taken such a position. See Saba
P'ship v. Comm'r, 1999-359 T.C. Memo, Par. 105 (1999).
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way that does not adequately reflect how they are used. The common
law doctrines are more than guides to construing the words of a rule.
Professor Bankman came close to this view in his defense of the partner-
ship anti-abuse regulation: "I believe the Treasury has always had the
residual, unstated power and responsibility ... to interpret the literal lan-
guage of the law according to its underlying purpose" because "all statu-
tory regimens require purpose-based interpretation. ' 55  Schauer's
approach, however, grounds the authority Bankman assigns to Treasury
in the nature of rules more generally and gives decision-makers even
greater latitude than does Bankman. Decision-makers use these common
law doctrines not when they need to understand the words or meaning of
a statutory or regulatory rule, but when the words of the rule seem in-
consistent with justifications.
The origin of the common law tax doctrines is generally traced back to
Judge Learned Hand in Gregory: "The meaning of a sentence may be
more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes,
and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in
which all appear. '56 In Schauer's terms, to accept judicial use of the anti-
abuse doctrines while denying the validity of codifying them is to ignore
the important relationship between a rule and its justification. Schauer's
presumptive positivism supports those who find standards such as busi-
ness purpose or anti-abuse requirements implicit in the Code's statutory
provisions because rules are, in his view, always linked to their
justifications.
At same time, however, presumptive positivism teaches that rule-gen-
erating justifications must carry particular weight because any tax statute
is part of a complicated set of interlocking rules. Decision-makers follow-
ing presumptive positivism would hesitate before allowing a justification
to trump the articulated rule. At least we would expect such to be the
case in the absence of codifying the standard. The impact of codifying a
standard moves us to the second strand of Schauer's analysis, the separa-
tion of powers. This second strand is a useful tool for viewing the tax
shelter debate whether or not we accept Schauer's understanding of the
relationship between rules and their justifications.
Critics who attack codification of judicial doctrines sometimes assert
that the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service, by virtue of the es-
tablished judicial doctrines, already possess the authority they are at-
tempting to establish in rules. Kenneth Kies, who was quoted above
urging a strict formalism, also has written, "[p]ursuant to several 'com-
mon-law' tax doctrines, Treasury and the Service have the ability to chal-
lenge taxpayer treatment of a transaction that they believe is inconsistent
55. Joseph Bankman, Stanford Professor Rebuts Criticism of Partnership Antiabuse
Reg., 94 TAX NoTEs TODAY 140-33 (1994), available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
56. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810-11.
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with statutory rules and the underlying congressional intent. ,57 Similarly,
the American Bar Association Committee comments on the partnership
anti-abuse rule asserted that existing judicial doctrines were adequate to
police abuse. 58 Critics of this position have pointed out the logical incon-
sistency of arguing both that codification is undesirable because it will
extend Treasury's authority and that codification is unnecessary because
Treasury already has the necessary authority pursuant to the judicial
doctrines.59
Once again, however, Schauer's analysis enables us to look at this ques-
tion from a different angle. If purposive standards are implicit in the cur-
rent rules, as both proponents and opponents of codifying the standards
have argued, we must wonder about the effect of codifying these stan-
dards. The New York State Bar Tax Section, emphasizing that a substan-
tive disallowance rule is not self-enforcing, has cautioned, "[a]ssuming
adequate enforcement of existing law, however, it is not clear what would
be added by enacting a substantive disallowance rule."'60 Indeed, some
members of the New York State Tax Section believe "there is literally
'nothing to be gained' from a substantive disallowance rule that only ap-
plies to tax benefits that would have been disallowed in any case under a
case law doctrine." 61
Nonetheless, codifying a standard would be expected, at the very least,
to have some effect on the calculus employed by judges acting as pre-
sumptive positivism in deciding whether to resort to these common law
doctrines. It would make the standard more salient. In Schauer's termi-
nology, codifying these justifications turn them into rules with "local pri-
ority."'62 Codification would thus lessen the weight to be assigned to the
rule-generating justifications of certainty, predictability, and reliance.
Even some who support codifying standards suggest that this impact,
although useful, might be small and primarily affect judges. Thus, Profes-
sor Bankman, speculating about Treasury's promulgating an anti-abuse
regulation for corporate tax shelters, believes that such codification
would "give the government an edge in any litigated matter" because
"[c]ourts give much greater deference to a position clearly incorporated
57. Kenneth J. Kies, A Critical Look at the Administration's 'Corporate Tax Shelter'
Proposals, 83 TAx NoTEs 1463, 1478 (1999).
58. See Caudill, supra note 51.
59. See Bankman, supra note 55.
60. Scarborough, supra note 38.
61. Id.
62. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 190-91. As Schauer explains:
[T]he power of rules is increased within a rule system to the extent that rules
have a local priority, both over their own justifications and over other more
distant rules within the system.... Local priority need not be absolute to be
a priority, any more than rules need be absolute in order to be rules. But
given that existing legal systems are (contingently) such that events will fre-
quently be conflicting controlled by rules more and less locally applicable,
some degree of local priority is necessary to preserve in these systems a mod-
icum of rule-based decisionmaking.
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in regulations than the same position supported only by an interpretation
of case law."'63 Professor Johnson also notes that "[a]nti-abuse rules are
developed and applied in litigation. '64 Some members of the New York
State Bar Association welcome anti-abuse rules to the extent they "pro-
vide a clear basis on which purported tax benefits may be disallowed and
therefore encourage the courts to find against the taxpayer if the matter
is ultimately litigated. '65
Schauer helps us to see that codifying standards will do more than
strengthen the ability of judges as presumptive positivism to deploy the
standards that are already part of the judicial arsenal. Codifying these
standards also will give administrative officers greater ability to attack
taxpayer transactions. That is, codifying these standards as rules will
change the decision-making calculus for administrative officials. It will
do more than affect certainty, predictability, and reliance in the system.
Such a change will have important consequences for separation of power
by expanding the jurisdiction of administrative agents.
Of course, the courts have an opportunity to apply the common law
doctrines only if some Internal Revenue agent has asserted that the tax-
payer has abused some provision of the Code, be they the installment sale
provisions at issue in ACM v. Commissioner66 or the foreign tax credits at
issue in Compaq Corp. v. Commissioner.67 Agents and government liti-
gators, however, know that they will win the case only if they can per-
suade a judge to consider the common law doctrines. It is the judge who
must be persuaded to use the authority to go behind a rule to its purpose.
Currently, these are doctrines for judges to wield.
Codifying these judicial doctrines would empower administrative
agents to decide for themselves whether to follow the rule or to resort to
its justification. While, as a matter of the first strand of Schauer's theory,
the nature of presumptive positivism, this authority is implicit in the no-
tion of rules, it is also true under the second strand, the impact of rules on
separation of powers, that codifying the justification will increase the dis-
cretion of administrative agents. Many, of course, have made this obvi-
ous point. The New York State Bar Association's Ad Hoc Committee,
for example, wrote that the corporate tax shelter provisions contained in
the administration's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget raised questions regarding
"the amount of discretion that should be granted to the administrative
arm of our government in determining corporate tax policy."' 68 Com-
menting on the proposals in the 2001 Budget, some members of the New
63. Joseph Bankman, The New Market In Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAx NoTEs
1775, 1778 (1999); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding deference to administrative decisions when congressional intent not clear); Ellen
P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996).
64. Johnson, supra note 53.
65. Scarborough, supra note 38, at n.3.
66. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
67. 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
68. Ad Hoc Committee on Corporate Tax Shelters, Comments on the Administration's
Corporate Tax Shelter Proposals, 83 TAX NoTEs 879, 881 (1999).
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York State Bar Tax Section expressed concern that "even a substantive
disallowance rule that applies only in the narrowest of cases has the po-
tential for being misunderstood, and misapplied" by IRS agents.69 Ac-
cording to Kenneth Kies, enactment of the Fiscal Year 2000 proposals
"would represent one of the broadest grants of authority ever given to
the Treasury Department and more importantly, to IRS agents."'70
Schauer's approach helps us see that these concerns reflect more than a
decrease in the Big Three rule-generating justifications, although practi-
tioner concerns are often expressed in terms of a decrease in the Big
Three. Kenneth Gideon, for example, asserted, "[a]ntiabuse rules trans-
fer that decision making process from the open and uniform arena of
rulemaking to the uncertainties of the audit process and virtually assure
that the results will vary from taxpayer to taxpayer."'71 Results vary from
taxpayer to taxpayer. Currently, the shadow of the judicial doctrines
hangs over all transactions. The crucial question underlying such objec-
tions is not the authority of administrative officials to make such deci-
sions, but the wisdom of assigning it to them. Recall that Schauer directs
us to view "rules not so much as implements for achieving predictability
but as devices for the allocation of power."'72
With some exceptions, 73 under the current state of matters, administra-
tive agents apply the rules, and identify cases in which purposive rules
might come into play, and courts decide whether purpose is allowed to
trump the rules. Schauer also helps us understand this jurisdictional as-
signment. As his book explains, we do not always want the "rule-applier
to determine whether following the rule is on the balance of reasons de-
sirable on this occasion."'74 We prefer to have one set of decision-makers
apply the rule and another determine whether the application is consis-
tent with the rule's justification.
Schauer offers a reason for this separation of powers. He reminds us
that in designing a rule-based regime, we need to "calculate the virtues of
ruleness based not only on an assessment of the costs of errors of under-
or over-inclusion, but also on an assessment of the incidence and conse-
quences of those errors that are more likely when decision makers are
not constrained by rules."'75 We believe our judges, whether Article I
judges with life tenure or Article III judges on the Tax Court, to be disin-
terested. We believe that there is no systematic bias in judicial decisions
in favor or against the taxpayer and that they are as likely to decide in
favor of the taxpayer as against the taxpayer.
Practitioners worry that IRS agents, whose duty is to collect the reve-
nue, are likely to err in the direction of finding abuse on the part of tax-
69. Scarborough, supra note 38, at 16 n.3.
70. Kies, supra note 57, at 1464.
71. Gideon, supra note 3, at 1001.
72. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 98.
73. See discussion infra Part III.
74. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 98.
75. Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, supra note 29, at 685.
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payers. The fear is that the default rule in every close case will be to
impose liability on the taxpayer. Practitioners' objection to codification
of standards rests in good measure, and understandably enough, on their
unease regarding revenue agents. To many practitioners, the current
state of affairs achieves the regime Schauer would envision. We do not
adhere slavishly to rules. In fact, we permit consideration of the rule's
justification, and we assign that task not to the agents who apply the rules
in order to collect revenue but to our disinterested judges.
In sum, Schauer's approach to rules helps us understand objections to
codification of anti-abuse doctrines, whether by statute or regulation. By
increasing the local priority of these common law doctrines, codification
increases the power of administrative officials. Such a statement may
seem a truism. The advantage of using Schauer's approach, however, is
that it helps us to distinguish concerns about inconsistency and other vio-
lations of the Big Three from concerns about separation of power.
Schauer, however, does not cease analysis at this point. He also calls
for consideration of the decision-making environment.76 Such considera-
tion, I believe, answers many of the critics' concerns about expanding the
discretion of IRS agents. The response of Treasury and the IRS to grants
or assertions of administrative discretion belie many of these concerns.
As discussed further below, history shows that Treasury and the IRS have
heeded the call of Kenneth Culp Davis, the dean of administrative law:
"When legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without meaning-
ful standards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest fea-
sible time, and then, as circumstances permit, should further confine their
own discretion through principles and rules."'77 Treasury and the IRS
have frequently constricted broad grants and assertions of discretion.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE NARROWING OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
Schauer posits that rules always carry with them the possibility of dis-
cretionary power. Administration of rules itself involves a considerable
amount of discretion in deciding whether to enforce the rule in a particu-
lar case. The IRS is frequently accused of abusing this discretion. In
1998, highly publicized Senate Finance hearings held by Senator Roth on
abuse by IRS agents gave rise to a new Taxpayer Bill of Rights with a
variety of provisions to protect taxpayers against harassment by IRS
agents. 78 Yet, a recent GAO Report disputed the charges of cronyism
and abuse made during the hearings, 79 and data recently compiled by the
76. See SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 173.
77. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 55 (1969).
78. See generally Leandra Lederman, Of Taxpayer Rights, Wrongs, and A Proposed
Remedy, 87 TAX NOTES 1133 (2000).
79. See General Accounting Office, GAO Report on Allegations of IRS Taxpayer
Abuse, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 80-13 (2000), available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
File; Ryan J. Donmoyer, Roth's IRS Abuse Hearings Take Another Pounding, 87 TAX
NOTES 463, 463 (2000).
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IRS and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found
that a significant number of complaints of harassment were
unsubstantiated.80
We see similar responsible use of administrative power and discretion if
we move to anti-abuse rules that have been codified. Consider the part-
nership anti-abuse regulations that raised such a storm of protest. One
practitioner declared, "I don't think the bar has seen such an extraordi-
nary abrogation of authority since Watergate;" another decreed that the
date of the notice of rulemaking was "a day that will live in infamy."' l
Yet, the IRS recently released a 1998 ISP Settlement Guideline address-
ing the partnership anti-abuse regulation.8 2 While the guideline asserts
the authority of the IRS to recast abuse partnership transactions and
summarizes the rule, it also includes a biography of ten articles criticizing
the regulations and only three defending them. Two of the most ardent
critics of the regulation predict "that an IRS field agent reading the Settle-
ment Guideline will read into the paper's unique bibliography the mes-
sage that pursuing a partnership anti-abuse case should not be
undertaken lightly."'83 I agree. The administrative agency is voluntarily
narrowing its discretion, out of concerns for both the Big Three and sepa-
ration of powers.
The history of section 482, with its very general language and enormous
grant of authority to the Secretary,84 offers even greater assurance that
80. See Amy Hamilton, No Misconduct Found in 95 Percent of Alleged IRS Harass-
ment Cases, 88 TAX NOTES 978, 978 (2000).
81. Douglass Antonio et al., Chicago Group Calls for OMB Investigation of Treasury's
Decision Not to Analyze Partnership Antiabuse Reg's Effect on Economy, 94 Tax Notes
Today 142-38 (1994), available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; see Sheldon I. Banoff,
Anatomy of An Antiabuse Rule: What's Really Wrong With Reg. Section 1.701-2, 66 TAX
NOTES 1859 (1995); Caudill, supra note 51; Richard Lipton, Controversial Partnership Anti-
Abuse Regs. Raise Many Questions, 81 J. TAX'N 68 (1994).
82. ISP Settlement Guideline Addresses Partnership Antiabuse Rule, 2000 TAX NOTES
TODAY 105-14 (2000), available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
83. Sheldon I. Banoff & Richard M. Lipton, IRS Settlement Guidelines on Subchapter
K Anti-Abuse Rule, 93 J. TAX'N 64, 65 (2000).
84. Section 482 currently provides:
In the case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and
whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, appor-
tionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses.
In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or
license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.
I.R.C. § 482 (1986). As Bittker and Eustice note, the provision "seems to amalgamate
several pervasive themes and policies of the tax law: tax-avoidance principles, the assign-
ment of income doctrine, general deduction theories, and clear reflection of net income
under the parties' accounting methods." BORIS I. BITIKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 13.20[1][c] (6th ed. 1999).
Moreover, they explain, "it lays down no principles to determine when taxes are being
evaded or when income is not clearly reflected." Id.
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administrative officials will act to narrow codified anti-abuse authority
and that judicial oversight will help ensure that they do so. At the same
time that the New York State Bar Association criticized codification of
anti-abuse standards for corporate tax shelters, it acknowledged that
other statutory anti-abuse provisions, such as sections 482, 7701(f) and
7701(1) have operated well. "[A] statute like Section 482 of the Code can,
even though it merely reiterates already extant legal concepts, develop
into a 'repository' of organized guidance and provide a clear basis for
challenge and responses. ' 85 The history of section 482, however, is more
complicated than the New York State Bar acknowledges. At the time of
its predecessor's introduction, the provision did far more than reiterate
already extant legal concepts. In comparison, codifying common law
anti-abuse doctrines in the case of corporate tax shelters would seem to
be an easy case.
Section 482 traces its origin back more than seventy years. It has its
source in regulations, rather than in either statutory provisions or judicial
interpretations. That is, it originally represented authority that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service explicitly gave itself. Regulations promulgated
under the 1917 War Excess Profits Tax 86 required every corporation "to
describe in its return all its intercorporate relationships with other corpo-
rations with which it is affiliated" and, if necessary, authorized the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue to require a consolidated return. 87
These regulations were codified as a statute in section 240 of the Reve-
nue Act of 1918.88 The version of the provision enacted in 1921 included
language strongly reminiscent of today's section 482. The 1921 statute
authorized the Commissioner to "consolidate the accounts of ... related
trades and businesses, in any property case, for the purpose of making an
accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deduc-
tion or capital between or among such related trades or businesses."8 9
When this provision became section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code,
as part of the Revenue Act of 1928, elimination of the consolidated re-
turn provisions required some changes in the statutory language, changes
that closely parallel the current provision.90 Section 45 permitted the
Commissioner "to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or de-
ductions between or among [two or more] trades or businesses, if he de-
termines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any
such trades or businesses." 91 Section 482's language has undergone little
85. Scarborough, supra note 38, at n.3.
86. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
87. Reg. 41, art. 77, 78 (1918).
88. 40 Stat. 1057, Pub. L. No. 254 (1918).
89. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 227, 319 (1921).
90. See H.R. Rep. No. 70-2, at 16-17, reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, at 522 (1953) [hereinafter SEID-
MAN, 1938-18611.
91. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 791, 806 (1928).
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change since 1928.92 The most important change was the addition in 1986
of a second sentence governing intangible property.93
Neither has the purpose changed considerably over the years. The leg-
islative history to the 1918 provision explained that "consolidation...
prevent[s] evasion which cannot be successfully blocked in any other way.
Among affiliated corporations it frequently happens that the accepted in-
tercompany transfer assigns too much income ... to Company A [and]
not enough to Company B."' 94 The Senate Finance Committee explained
that the purpose of the 1921 provision "was to prevent subsidiaries, espe-
cially foreign subsidiaries, from the 'arbitrary shifting of profits among
related businesses. '95 The legislative history of the 1928 provision speaks
of the need to prevent evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of
fictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of
'milking)." 96
Section 482 and it predecessors give the Internal Revenue Service
enormous discretion to decide whether taxes are being evaded or income
is not being clearly reflected, and this authority has withstood challenge.
In 1935, Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. CIR rejected a constitutional challenge
to section 45.97 The Second Circuit, citing the then-recent case of Greg-
ory v. Helvering,98 wrote,
even without such a statute as section 45, many cases have gone very
far in disregarding formal transfers introduced into corporate trans-
action for the purpose of escaping taxation .... If anticipatory ar-
rangements intended to circumvent taxes may be disregarded by the
courts without the aid of statutory authority, a statute authorizing
the Commissioner to disregard them under similar circumstances
cannot be unconstitutional. 99
92. The 1934 Act added the word "organizations" to the phrase "trades or businesses"
in order to confirm that the provision is applicable to all types of business activity. H.R.
Rep. No. 73-704, at 24 (1934), reprinted in SEIDMAN, 1938-1861, supra note 90, at 323. The
1944 Act changed the phrase "gross income or deductions" to "gross income, deduction,
credits or allowances." Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 128(b), 58 Stat. 48 (1944). These
additions were made to make clear that § 45 was not narrower than the newly enacted
§ 129 of the 1939 Code (currently section 269). H.R. Rep. No. 78-871 at 50, reprinted in
SEIDMAN, J.S. SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROF-
ITS TAX LAws 1953-1939, at 1475 (1953) [hereinafter SEIDMAN, 1953-1939].
93. Section 1231(e) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63(1986),
added the following sentence to § 482: "In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangi-
ble property (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such
transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible."
94. S. Rep. No. 65-617, at 8-9 (1918), reprinted in SEIDMAN, 1938-1861, supra note 90,
at 923.
95. S. Rep. No. 67-275, at 19 (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN, 1938-1861, supra note 90, at
875.
96. H.R. Rep. No. 70-2, at 16-17 (1982), reprinted in SEIDMAN, 1938-1861, supra note
90, at 522. Bittker and Eustice describe the principal function of section 482 is much the
same terms: "the prevention of artificial shifting, milking, or distorting of the true taxable
incomes of commonly controlled enterprises." BITrKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 84, at
13.20[1][a].
97. 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1935).
98. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
99. Asiatic, 79 F.2d at 238.
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Congress rejected challenges to the Commissioner's discretion in 1934,
1948, and 1951.100 In hearings before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee in 1948, one witness urged
Taxation should be by law and not by man. In section 45 that theory
is more or less demolished .... Under that provision the sky is the
limit and liabilities are at the whim and caprice of an administrative
officer.... [T]he section does not establish any rules or practice or
condemn intercompany business transactions of particular character
but vests in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue unlimited and
unrestricted power to increase the liability of various affiliated busi-
nesses in such manner as he may see fit.1 1
Congress rejected the plea to repeal section 482. Congress has also re-
jected two proposed amendments to section 482, one in 1955 targeting
captive insurance companies and the other in 1962 establishing a multi-
factor formula for allocating income of multinational corporations, in
favor the of the broad administrative authority of section 482.102
The Commissioner has exercised this administrative authority through
regulations that have grown increasingly elaborate over the years. Regu-
lations issued in 1935 under section 45 set out an arm's length standard,
but did not mandate the use of any particular allocation method.10 3 In
the 1930s, however, with few U.S. companies with multinational affiliates,
the provision had little impact and was known as the "silent
policeman.' 10 4
As multinational issues grew, so did the impact of section 482, and in
1962 Congress directed Treasury to "explore the possibility of developing
and promulgating regulations under [section 482] which would provide
additional guidelines and formulas for the allocation of income and de-
ductions in cases involving foreign income. ' 105 Lengthy regulations were
issued in proposed form in 1965, withdrawn and reproposed in 1966, and
issued in final form in 1968.106 A press release accompanying the 1968
regulations promised that they would be administered "in a spirit of rea-
100. See Francis Allegra, Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion
Standard of Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAX. REV. 423,441 n.51 (1994) (citing Hearings Before
the House Comm. On Ways & Means on the Revenue Revision of 1934, 73d Cong, 1st
Sess. 186-87 (statement of George Morris); Hearings Before the House Comm. On Ways
and Means on Proposed Revisions to the Internal Revenue Code, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 3324
(1948) (statement of C.S. Stein); Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1867-68 (1951) (statement of A. Hyman)).
101. Id. at 441 n.52 (citing Hearings Before the House Comm. On Ways & Means on
Proposed Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 3241 (1948) (state-
ment of Arthur B. Hyman)).
102. See id. at 443-44 nn.54-56.
103. Treas. Reg. § 45-1(b)(1935).
104. Warren C. Seieroe & Lawrence Gerber, Section 482-Still Growing at the Age of
50, 46 TAXES 893, 894 (1968).
105. See Allegra, supra note 100, at 447 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 2508, at 19 (1962)).
106. 30 Fed. Reg. 4256 (1965); 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966); T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218.
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sonableness.' u0 7 These regulations, like those issued in 1935, adopted the
arm's length standard, but also established special rules for specific kinds
of intercompany transactions, including performance of services, the li-
censes or sale of intangible property, and the sale of tangible property.
Section 482 received increased attention in the late 1980s and in the
1990s. At the same time that it added a sentence to section 482 regarding
intangibles, Congress directed the Treasury Department to conduct a
"comprehensive study of intercompany pricing rules" and to consider
modifying the regulations. 10 8 The Treasury Department issued its White
Paper on section 482 in October 1988.109
A series of extraordinarily lengthy and complicated proposed, tempo-
rary, and final regulations followed. Regulations were proposed early in
1992 implementing many of the suggestion in the White Paper. Tempo-
rary and proposed regulations modifying the 1992 proposed regulations
were issued on January 13, 1993.110 Final regulations were issued in
199411 and 1995.112 The section 482 regulations now run almost 100
pages.113 Bittker and Eustice say of them that "like all versions of these
regulations, there are no bright lines or safe harbors .... Moreover, it is
clear that § 482 pricing issues are even more fact-driven under the final
regulations, a situation that does not make for ready predictability.""114
They also conclude, however, that "as a remedial tool, § 482, especially as
augmented by the regulations, can properly be described as more precise
than underlying substantive rules" such as tax-avoidance principles, the
assignment of income, doctrine, or general deduction theories "because it
permits all aspects of the income distortion to be corrected. ' '115
Section 482 thus teaches that broad anti-abuse statutory standards be-
come more detailed and articulated over time. The attention received
reflects the importance of the transactions governed; section 482 grew
with multinational operations and issues. Section 482 also demonstrates
that a broad anti-abuse statute, even one that by its terms seems to grant
enormous discretion to administrative officers, does not displace judicial
oversight. Courts have not hesitated to overturn the Commissioners' de-
107. See James S. Eustice, Affiliated Corporations Revisited: Recent Developments
under Section 482 and 367, 24 TAX. L. REV. 101, 102 (1968-96) (citing Treasury Department
Release F-1217).
108. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-638 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3
C.B. (vol. 4) 638.
109. See Department of the Treasury, A Study of Intercompany Pricing, 8 TAX NoTEs
TODAY 213-74, available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
110. T.D. 8470 (Jan. 1, 1993).
111. T.D. 8852 (July 1, 1994)
112. T.D. 8632 (Dec. 19, 1995). The 1995 regulations relate specifically cost-sharing in
connection with the statutory language added in 1986 regarding intangibles. In 1996 T.D.
8670 (May 13, 1996) eliminated the requirement that developed intangibles be used in the
active conduct of business. In addition, on March 6, 1998, the IRS proposed a large set of
regulations under section 482 related to income earned in global securities dealing opera-
tions. 63 Fed. Reg. 11,177 (1998).
113. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-.0 to 1.482-8 and 1.482-1A to 1.482-2A.
114. BI-rrER & EUSTICE, supra note 84, at 13.20[6][3] (2000 Supp.).
115. Id. at 13.29[1][c].
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terminations under section 482 as arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,
or otherwise limit asserted administrative authority.'1 6
Moreover, in the case of section 482, administrative developments in-
clude not only regulations, but also a formal mechanism known as an
Advanced Pricing Agreement or ("APA"), under which the taxpayer and
the IRS agree in advance that a specific set of related party transactions
would satisfy section 482.117 In developing these procedures, the IRS has
acted to promote rule-generating justifications, here, in particular pre-
dictability. Another rule theorist, Louis Kaplow, explains that
"[a]rguments about and definitions of rules and standards commonly em-
phasize the distinction between whether the law is given content ex ante
or ex post.""n 8 Using this distinction, the APA mechanism transforms the
standard of section 482 into a rule for the particular taxpayer.
Perhaps most telling is the history related to spin-offs such as the one at
issue in Gregory. The Revenue Act of 1924 permitted tax-free spin-
offs.119 It provided that the transfer by a corporation of part or all of its
property to a second corporation constituted a tax-free reorganization if
the first corporation or its stockholders (or both) were in control of the
second corporation immediately after the first transfer and that the share-
holders of the first corporation recognized no gain if stock of the second
corporation was distributed to them as part of the reorganization plan. 120
As is well-known in tax law history, the Supreme Court in Gregory v.
Helvering'2' affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit finding that satis-
fying the literal language of the statute did not ensure tax-free treatment
because the transaction lacked a business purpose. The Court declared:
When [the statute] speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation
to another, it means a transfer made "in pursuance of a plan of reor-
ganization" of corporate business; and not a transfer of assets by one
corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to
the business of either, as plainly is the case here. . . . [T]he transac-
tion upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold
otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the
statutory provision in question of all serious purpose. 122
The Gregory decision, from the time of its issuance, was widely criticized
for undermining certainty, predictability, and reliance-the Big Three
116. See generally Allegra, supra note 100; 57 Fed. Reg. 3571; Eli Lilly & Co., 84 T.C. 96
(1985), affd in part, 856 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1988); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.
252 (1987); Merck & Co. v. U.S., 24 Cl. Ct. 73 (1991); U.S. Steel Corp. v. CIR, 607 F.2d (2d
Cir. 1980).
117. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375; Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 542.
118. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
557 (1992); see also SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 131.
119. For another discussion of this history, see Steven A. Bank, Taxing Divisive and
Disregarded Mergers, 34 GA. L. REV. 1523, 1577-81 (2000).
120. Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 256 (1924).
121. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).




Even before the Supreme Court issued its opinion, however, Congress
was reconsidering the reorganization provisions. The Treasury Depart-
ment, in its 1933 testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means,
called upon Congress to redraft the reorganization provisions completely
because they were overspecific and denied Treasury leeway in administra-
tion of the law. Treasury did not want to rely on courts to interpret spe-
cific sections in order to carry out the intent of the statute. In language
strongly reminiscent of today's debates, Treasury urged Congress:
to express in the statute as simply as possible the general plan for
dealing with these transactions, leaving to the Department as in
other cases the power to make rules and regulations to carry out the
congressional intent .... In the cases of complicated subjects of this
kind, it is almost impossible to foresee all the ingenious devices
which lawyers will invent and to provide against them expressly in
the statute. The more effective plan is to place the responsibility
squarely upon the Department administering the law from day to
day. It can readily amend its regulations to cover new situations as
they arise.124
Congress did not heed Treasury. Instead, in the Revenue Act of 1934,
it eliminated the statutory provision allowing the spin-off.'2 5 Legislative
history of this change explains that under the earlier provision corpora-
tions "found it possible to pay what would otherwise be taxable divi-
dends, without any taxes upon their shareholders.' 2 6 The committee
believed that this means of avoidance should be ended.127
Authority for a tax-free spin-off did not reappear until 1951, when Con-
gress amended the 1939 Code to permit a tax-free spin-off of the common
stock of a subsidiary under section 112(b)(11). This statute required post-
distribution conduct of two or more trades or businesses and that the
transaction not be used principally as a device for the distribution of
earnings and profits.'2 8 The 1951 statute did not explicitly require a busi-
ness purpose, although the legislative history stated that tax-free spin-offs
were to be permitted only for distributions "for legitimate business pur-
poses" not related to any desire to make a distribution of earnings and
123. See Note, Corporate Reorganization to Avoid Payment of Income Tax, 45 YALE
L.J. 134, 140 n.38 (1936) (citing articles).
124. Statement of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury Regarding the Preliminary Re-
port of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means Relative to Methods of
Preventing the Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue Laws Together with Sug-
gestions for the Simplification and Improvement Thereof (1933).
125. See Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680 (1934). Bittker and Eustice write, "[h]ad
Congress withheld its legislative hand until after the Supreme Court's decision, it might
have decided that the courts could be trusted to distinguish legitimate spin-offs from tax-
avoidance devices." B=lrKER & EUSrICE, supra note 84, 11.01[2][a].
126. H.R. Rep. No. 704, at 14 (1934), reprinted in SEIDMAN, 1938-1861, supra note 90, at
338.
127. See id.
128. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 317, 65 Stat. 493 (1951) (adding Section 112(b)(11)




Just three years later, as part of the 1954 Code, Congress replaced sec-
tion 112(b)(11) with section 355. Section 355, like its predecessor, re-
quires the post-distribution active contact of two or more businesses and
that the transaction not be a device for the distribution of earnings and
profits. Although commentary generally assumed that the device prohi-
bition served to codify Gregory and its business purpose requirement, the
statutory language does not require a business purpose. 130
Regulations published in 1955 included an explicit business purpose re-
quirement under section 355, but only in connection with the distribution
of shares.' 3 ' These section 355 regulations required examination of the
entire transaction to see if it was intended as a device, but referred to
regulations under section 368, the reorganization provisions, for a general
business purpose requirement. 132
The Internal Revenue Service announced in 1964 that it would update
the section 355 regulations, 133 but the proposed regulations did not ap-
pear until 1977. Perhaps the most important change proposed was a new
emphasis on business purpose independent from the device prohibition.
Proposed regulation 1.355-2 stated that section 355 requires of the tax-
payer "real and substantial nontax reasons germane to the business of the
corporation." According to one contemporary commentary, it was the
"opinion of the authors that one of the primary emphases of the pro-
posed regulations was to announce to taxpayers that business purpose
and device are two separate, equal, unrelated requirements.' 1 34 Another
piece suggested that the regulations reflected judicial developments
under section 355 in the years since its enactment and original
regulations. 35
Many reacted with horror to what they saw as a new view of the busi-
ness purpose doctrine. Some denied the Treasury authority to introduce
it. The authors quoted above also had this to say:
129. S. Rep. No. 781, at 58 (1951), reprinted in SEIDMAN, 1938-1861, supra note 90 at
1566.
130. See Charles S. Whitman, III, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to
Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1204 (1968).
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b), (c) (1955). Treas. Reg. §1.355-2(c) (1955) provided:
The distribution by a corporation of stock or securities of a controlled corpo-
ration to its shareholders with respect to its own stock or to its security hold-
ers in exchange for its own securities will not qualify under section 355 where
carried out for purposes not germane to the business of the corporations.
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1955) ("All the requisites of business and corporate pur-
poses described under § 1.368 must be met to exempt a transaction.., under this section").
133. Rev. Rul. 64-17, 1964-C.B. 579.
134. Thomas R. Helfand & Brian D. Lafving, Filling the Serbonian Bog with Quick-
sand-Proposed Section 355 Regulations Further Obscure Corporate Separations-Part 1, 5
J. CORP. TAx'N 345, 350 (1978); see also John W. Lee, Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhaul
Device Test and Single-Business Divisions, J. TAX'N 194, 194 (1977).
135. New York State Bar Association Tax Section Committee on Reorganizations, Re-
port on Proposed Section 355 Regulations, TAXES 656, 657 n.8 (1977) (citing Comm'r v.
Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1964); Rafferty v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1970)).
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[T]he business-purpose requirement is a judicially mandated doc-
trine which is not reflected in the statute. The courts have the sole
authority to determine the nature and extent of the doctrine. Al-
though the regulations may provide rules which are not encompassed
by the statute, the courts are not bound to follow them .... because
the doctrine is strictly one of judicial origin capable of judicial devel-
opment absent legislative intervention.136
Other commentators at the time also criticized the business purpose
requirement. 137
The proposed regulations were not finalized until 1989, almost twelve
years after they were proposed.' 38 The preamble to the final regulations
acknowledged criticism of requiring an independent business purpose for
a transaction, but preserved this requirement. 139 Under the final regula-
tions the business purpose requirement, while closely related to the de-
vice prohibition, is explicitly made an independent requirement:
Section 355 applies to a transaction only if it is carried out for one or
more corporate business purposes. A transaction is carried out for a
corporate business purpose if it is motivated, in whole or substantial
part, by one or more corporate business purposes. The potential for
the avoidance of Federal taxes by the distributing or controlled cor-
porations (or a corporation controlled by either) is relevant in deter-
mining the extent to which an existing corporate business purpose
motivated the distribution. The principle reason for this business
purpose requirement is to provide nonrecognition treatment only to
distributions that are incident to readjustments of corporate struc-
tures required by business exigencies and that effect only readjust-
ments of continuing interests in property under modified corporate
forms. This business purpose requirement is independent of the
other requirements under section 355.140
Practitioners viewed the final regulations as not only clarifying this re-
quirement by revising and adding examples, but also strengthening it. As
one article characterized them:
[T]he final Section 355 Regulations significantly fortify the business
purpose test. Once taken for granted by many practitioners, this test
may now be difficult to satisfy. Not only will the Service examine
alternative means for accomplishing the stated business purpose, but
the presence of Federal tax savings at the corporate level-such as a
subsequent S election will draw further scrutiny.' 41
136. Thomas R. Helfand & Brian D. Lafving, Filling the Serbonian Bog with Quick-
sand-Proposed Section 355 Regulations Further Obscure Corporate Separations-Part 2, 5
J. CORP. TAX'N, 53, 68 (1978).
137. See Katherine Corinne Hall, Comments: Internal Revenue Code Section 355: Re-
cent Trends, 31 Sw. L.J. 523, 538-39 (1977) (citing other commentators).
138. T.D. 8238, 54 Fed. Reg. 283 (Jan. 5, 1989).
139. See id.
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1955).
141. Mark J. Silverman, Kevin M. Keyes, and Pamela C. Berry, What Is A Business
Purpose Under the Section 355 Regs?, 71 J. TAx'N 4, 9 (1989). As they go on to note, "The
business purpose test, as tightened by the Regulations, clearly reflects GU repeal." Id.
After the 1986 Tax Reform Act, section 355 was the last surviving method of distributing
20011
SMU LAW REVIEW
For example, the regulations, specify that a section 355 transaction is per-
missible only if the business problem cannot be solved by another tax-
free transaction that is neither impractical nor unduly expensive. 142
With the importance now accorded business purpose, the IRS contin-
ues to give taxpayers further guidance on this requirement.143 Revenue
Procedure 96-30 gives detailed guidelines that the IRS uses for ruling pur-
poses in evaluating whether a distribution satisfies the business purpose
requirement. 144 The Appendix to the Revenue Procedure lists nine cate-
gories of business purpose, including providing an equity interest to a key
employee, facilitating a stock offering or borrowing, resolving manage-
ment or customer problems, and protecting one business from the risks of
another. 145 Both the Revenue Procedure and the Appendix carefully
note that the business purposes listed in the Appendix are not an exclu-
sive list.
In sum, business purpose as a requirement for spin-offs began as a judi-
cial doctrine in Gregory. It was not explicitly incorporated into the statu-
tory codification of the concerns reflected in Gregory. The business
purpose requirement began to take a key role in administrative under-
standing of section 355 with the notice of proposed rulemaking in 1977
and took on even more importance with the repeal of the General Utili-
ties doctrine. It is now an issue for which taxpayers can and do obtain
private letter rulings to ensure certainty ex ante about satisfying its
requirements.
As codified in the section 355 regulations, the business purpose re-
quirement reflects its own arc of development. The business purpose re-
quirement under the section 355 regulations, for example, is more strict
than under the section 368 regulations. 146 Nonetheless, taxpayers and
their advisors have learned to live with the section 355 business purpose
requirement, as the dozens of private letter rulings blessing section 355
transactions show.147 This requirement has not shut down section 355
spin-offs. Codification of the judicial doctrine has neither proved un-
workable nor destroyed the doctrine. Business purpose as an anti-abuse
tax-free appreciated corporate assets. At the time the section 355 regulations were final-
ized much of the commentary emphasized business purpose. See also Ross S. Friedman &
P. Anthony Nissley, New Regs. Provide Rules for Avoiding Tax in Spin-offs, Split-offs and
Divisive Reorgs, 42 TAX'N FOR Accr. 206 (1989); Samuel M. Maruca, Corporate Separa-
tions: The § 355 Final Regulations, 30 TAX MGM'T MEMORANDUM 119 (1989); Current Tax
Developments, Temporary and Final Regulations, 17 TAX'N FOR LAW. 2 (1989).
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(30); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(5), ex. 3-5.
143. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 88-34, 1988-1 C.B. 115.
144. Rev. Proc. 96-30, app. A., 1996-19 I.R.B. 8.
145. See id.
146. See MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
BUYOUTS 1005, at 10-38 (1999).
147. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-30-17 (Oct. 21, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-25-054 (Mar.




doctrine continues to play a role in judicial decisions. 148
The history of the business purpose requirement under the section 482
and section 355 regulations, then, should reassure the New York State
Bar and others that codifying anti-abuse standards will not undermine the
development of common law doctrines. More generally and more impor-
tantly, it demonstrates how, in exercising discretion under such broad
standards as section 482 or the section 355 regulations, or Treasury and
the IRS act in ways to make the justifications more predictable, reliable,
and certain. They make these codified standards more rule-like, limiting
their own discretion in the interest of the justifications for having rules.
Treasury's own actions, particularly to the extent private letter rulings are
available, give substantial weight to the Big Three.
IV. THE CASE OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
This history gives solace and support to those who would codify judicial
doctrines. Such codification will empower Treasury and the IRS in a way
that judicial victories do not. Administrative agencies will be careful of
any codified discretion exercising this discretion cautiously and also vol-
untarily constricting it through procedures, regulations, and rulings.
But not all of this history reassures. Sections 482 and 355 developed
over decades. A key concern about the current corporate tax shelters is
that we no longer have the luxury of leisurely elaboration and evolution
because of the emergence of a tax shelter industry constantly developing
and marketing tax products as developed. 149 Regarding any particular
shelter, Treasury and the IRS are able to act only after the fact and pro-
spectively and in so doing encourage promoters constantly to develop
new tax shelters.1 50
In addition, the opinions written by tax lawyers play an important role
in the marketing of today's tax shelter. As Professor Bankman has writ-
ten, "the opinion provides insurance against tax penalties; more specula-
tively, it also provides psychological support to executives and their
advisors."'15 Bankman continues,
The opinion writing process is by all accounts odd, in large part be-
cause the law is so ill-defined. Virtually all tax shelters comply with
the literal language of a relevant (and perhaps the most relevant)
statute, administrative ruling, or case. The issue presented is
whether the result is so at odds with economic reality and/or tax the-
ory that it ought to be trumped by a competing legal rule. Fre-
quently, the only competing legal rule is one encapsuled, perhaps, in
common law doctrines such as business purpose, substance over
form, step transaction and sham transaction... [T]hese doctrines are
148. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 21 (1999); Caruth v. United
States, 688 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989); Wortham
Mach. Co. v. United States, 521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975).
149. See Bankman, supra note 63, at 1780.
150. Id. at 1780-81.
151. Id. at 1782.
2001]
SMU LAW REVIEW
* by their nature analytically elusive (some might describe these doc-
trines in harsher terms) and are interpreted only in a few cases. 152
In other words, tax lawyers are also decision-makers faced with the task
of applying a rule or resorting to its justification.
As with administrative officials, Schauer directs us to ask in what direc-
tion these decision-makers are likely to err. Private practitioners fear
that administrative officials exercise the judicial doctrines to err in favor
of the FISC and against taxpayers. Administrative officials fear that tax
lawyers, charged with the duty of representing their client zealously, are
likely to err in favor of their clients, and thus they may be too likely to
ignore these judicial doctrines.
Private practitioners have suggested that judicial doctrines need to be
made more salient in the opinion-writing process. Recently, both the
New York State Bar Association and the American College of Tax Coun-
sel recommended that Circular 230 be amended to require lawyers to ad-
dress the applicability of the common-law doctrines.' 53 The New York
State Bar Association recommends that any reasonable cause opinion
"should be required to specifically address and opine on all applicable
judicial doctrines, including the business purpose, step transaction, eco-
nomic substance, substance over form and sham transaction doctrines, as
well as applicable statutory and regulatory doctrines, such as clear reflec-
tion of income and anti-abuse rules."'1 54
As discussed above, codifying these judicial doctrines would make
them even more salient. Currently, application of these judicial doctrines
is believed by many to be under-inclusive. Many fear that if the doctrines
were codified, their application would become over-inclusive thereby
chilling legitimate business transactions.' 55 Deciding whether over-inclu-
sion or under-inclusion produces the greatest danger is an empirical ques-
tion-how many tax shelters and at what size would be stopped by
codifying judicial doctrines versus how many legitimate transactions and
at what size would be stopped by this codification.
It is always difficult to predict the impact of an anti-abuse rule on legiti-
mate transactions and the extent to which the business community will be
able to adjust to any new rules. Whether in the case of today's corporate
tax shelters under-inclusion or over-inclusion poses the greater danger
thus comes down to a matter of judgment. The question of judgment,
however, must extend beyond the limits of the corporate tax shelter. An
additional consideration is whether the presence of tax shelters under-
152. Id.
153. James E. Merritt, Association Recommends Changes to Circular 230, 2000 TAX
NOTES TODAY 158-44 (2000), available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; Robert H.
Scarborough, NYSBA Tax Section Proposes Changes to Circular 230, 2000 TAX NoTEs To-
DAY, available at LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File 150-31 (Aug. 3, 2000).
154. Scarborough, supra note 38.
155. See Kenneth J. Kies, A Critical Look at 'Corporate Tax Shelter' Proposals, 83 TAX
NoTEs 1463 (1999); Peter Faber, June 16, 2000 Letter to the Editor, 87 TAX NoTEs 1666
(2000); Peter Faber, July 7, 2000 Letter to the Editor, 88 TAX NoTEs 279 (2000).
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mines respect for the tax system in general and encourages abuse in other
areas of tax law. 156 The tax shelter debate ultimately forces us to go be-
yond the justifications embedded in judicial doctrines such as business
purpose to far broader justifications behind the income tax itself, such as
vertical and horizontal equity. 157
While such broad considerations, of course, are beyond the scope of
this paper, it has been its aim to suggest that tax policy will benefit from
considering Professor's Schauer's approach to rules, which encourages,
even requires us, to consider the questions of purpose and justification
both in addressing corporate tax shelters and thinking more generally
about the tax code. His theory supports attempts to require considera-
tion of justifications through some codification of them, but does not dic-
tate we do so. It moves us beyond questions of authority to questions of
the wisdom of such an approach. Even if we do not accept his emphasis
or justification for rules, he urges us to consider concerns about separa-
tion of powers and the kinds of errors likely to be made. His theory of
rules does not tell us which is the wisest approach, but it does help us to
decide what questions to ask and where to focus our analytical energies.
156. See Faber, July 7, 2000 Letter to the Editor, supra note 157.
157. JOSEPH DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCrRINE, STRUCrURE AND POL-
icy 21-25 (2d ed. Lexis Law Publishing 1999).
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